1
"If I die . . . I want my children to know I did everything I could." This 2 is a common feeling among terminally ill individuals facing death. This desire to exhaust every option often causes people to fight to receive potentially toxic and dangerous treatments that are still in the investigational phase if the treatment provides even a glimmer of hope for survival or improvement in condition. Investigational treatments, however, expose patients to myriad 3 risks that can be difficult to predict. Jolee Mohr's mysterious death provides 4 a sad illustration of the dangers of investigational drugs. Mrs. Mohr's 5 physician recruited her for a clinical trial to test the safety of an investigational arthritis treatment. After she received the investigational 6 treatment, Mrs. Mohr experienced intractable vomiting and increased body temperature. She subsequently slipped into unconsciousness, and her family 7 made the decision to remove life support after doctors confirmed that she had no hope of recovery. 8 Limiting access to investigational drugs may help prevent tragedies similar to Mrs. Mohr's. These limitations, however, reduce an individual's access to treatments that may provide the only hope for the terminally ill. A REV. 105, 115-16 (1995) .
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Wall Street Journal editorial revealed the effects of limits on access to investigational drugs when it published its plea to address Kianna Karnes's attempt to access two investigational cancer therapies. While the entire nation focused on the outcome of the Terri Schiavo controversy, Kianna Karnes was nearing the end of her battle against kidney cancer that had spread throughout her body. The circumstances surrounding the battle for the lives of these two 9 women, however, differed significantly. Kianna Karnes and her treating physicians believed that access to the right drugs would help prevent her death. Mrs. Karnes had sought, but was denied, access to two investigational 10 drugs that had the potential to help her in her battle against cancer. Both drugs had shown promise in FDA trials for many years. Mrs. Karnes, however, was 11 unable to access the drugs through any of the available channels. The sequence of events following the Wall Street Journal's editorial is tragic. Mrs. Karnes died the day after publication of the editorial at the age of forty-four, leaving behind four children. To add to this tragedy, the 12 manufacturers of the two investigational drugs contacted Mrs. Karnes's physician, and the FDA contacted her family immediately following the publication of the Journal's editorial. The Journal summarized the 13 hopelessness of the situation by noting, "isn't it a national scandal that cancer sufferers should have to be written about in the Wall Street Journal to be offered legal access to emerging therapies once they've run out of other options?" 14 The phenomenon of individuals seeking to access investigational drugs is not new. Patients hoping to exhaust every possible treatment before succumbing to death have sought access for several decades. The first criticisms of a "drug lag" arose shortly after the FDA began testing for efficacy in 1962. A 1973 study examined the effects of the new efficacy 15 requirements and determined that compliance with the FDA's clinical trial process discouraged research and prevented the introduction of some effective drugs into the market. appropriate role of government,' so as to overturn the long-standing tradition of the right of self-preservation."
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After rehearing the case en banc, the District of Columbia Circuit held that terminally ill adult patients had no fundamental right to access investigational drugs. The en banc majority traced drug regulation back to 28 Colonial Virginia and even back to 15th century England to conclude that there is a history of evolving government regulation of drugs in response to changing science and technology. Most importantly, the majority recognized 29 the interests of terminally ill individuals and emphasized that the legislative and regulatory branches of government are best equipped to find the appropriate balance between individual liberty and community safety.
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This note will explore the recent arguments presented by patientadvocates in support of a constitutionally protected liberty interest to access investigational drugs. Part I will explore the development of regulations governing the distribution of investigational drugs and demonstrate that limited access to investigational drugs should be permitted for certain individuals. Part II will explore potential constitutional foundations for a right of terminally ill patients to access certain investigational drugs and will demonstrate that current constitutional jurisprudence does not provide a strong framework for a right to access these drugs. Part III will examine potential statutory interpretations that would grant a right to access investigational drugs and the FDA's proposed method for increasing access. Part IV will point out the dangers of recognizing a constitutional right to access investigational drugs, show that such a right would likely become illusory, and conclude that increased access should occur through the legislative and regulatory process. Thalidomide disaster is considered one of the greatest tragedies in the history of medicine. Many experts still believe, however, that it was unavoidable.
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Thalidomide was widely used and praised as the most effective and safe sedative available. The drug was also widely used to treat morning sickness The FDA approval process is divided into three phases. Phase I trials enroll 10 to 100 individuals who are typically healthy. The average length of a Phase I trial is 1.5 years and costs approximately $10 million. The goal of this phase of testing is to establish a maximum safe dose for the drug. Phase 52 II trials enroll from 50 to 500 patients who suffer from the disease targeted by the drug. Researchers focus on the characteristics of patients who will be enrolled in the final phase of testing and make preliminary estimates of the effective doses of the drug and the duration of treatment. Phase II trials are approximately two years in length and cost $20 million on average. Phase III 53 is the final stage of testing during which researchers seek to determine whether the treatment is effective and to discover side effects of the drug. be met for a terminally ill patient to obtain access under Compassionate Use:
(1) the drug manufacturer must be willing to provide the investigational drug to the patient; (2) the patient must give informed consent; and (3) the treating physician must assume responsibility for treating the patient and agree to compile data about the effects of the investigational drug.
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The FDA should be commended for its efforts to continually increase access to investigational drugs. These efforts, however, need to continue so that the FDA can provide terminally ill patients with more options in the safest manner possible. The current structure for obtaining access outside of the clinical trial process must be reviewed and refined to become more responsive to, and reduce the burden imposed on, terminally ill patients. Stories of terminally ill patients dying, such as Kianna Karnes, are far too common. The current exclusive focus on safety must be balanced against the terminally ill individual's right to access investigational drugs. The FDA should strive to find the appropriate balance between these two competing interests so that people are protected from dangerous drugs, but also have the ability to access appropriate investigational drugs. In Glucksberg, four terminally ill patients and four physicians argued that a mentally competent, terminally ill adult has a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to commit physicianassisted suicide. The Court rejected this argument and held that the right to 76 physician-assisted suicide is not a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause because history demonstrates an almost universal and continuous rejection of this asserted liberty interest. The Court compared the asserted 77 right of physician-assisted suicide with the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and while concluding that these two decisions are both "personal and profound," pointed to the fact that the two decisions do not enjoy similar legal protection. The Court explained that the implied right to refuse 78 unwanted medical treatment "was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy," but rather was grounded in the common-law right of protection from unwanted interferences with bodily integrity-i.e., the protection accorded by battery law. The Court concluded that its 79 "assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation's history and government from the individual's decision making process. Access proponents conclude that any government interference in the decision of whether or not to take an investigational drug is a violation of an individual's right to selfdetermination.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR
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The argument that the right to access investigational drugs must be complementary to the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment seems to misperceive the basis for the right to refuse medical treatment. As previously mentioned, the right to refuse medical treatment is derived from the common law doctrines of battery and informed consent. These doctrines 103 focus on the individual's interest in bodily integrity and freedom from harmful or offensive touching. Therefore, the logical conclusion from these doctrines is that a person cannot be forced to undergo medical treatment. There is no 104 such logical conclusion from the common law doctrine of the right to access investigational drugs.
In Abigail Alliance, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia derived the right to access investigational drugs from the common law doctrines of necessity and self-defense. The court concluded that these The doctrine of self-defense is the privilege to use "all reasonable force to prevent any threatened harmful or offensive bodily contact, or any confinement . . . ." Both the necessity and self-defense doctrines focus on 112 the individual's freedom from unwanted touching and the avoidance of harm. Although these common law doctrines do provide some support that a person should have the ability to protect herself from harm, they do not by themselves lead to a logical conclusion that a person has a liberty interest in accessing investigational drugs. The District of Columbia Circuit rejected Abigail Alliance's argument that self-defense principles permit a terminally ill individual to assume "'enormous risks' in pursuit of potentially life-saving drugs." Due to the emphasis on freedom from unwanted touching or bodily 113 harm, the doctrines actually provide further support for a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, rather than a right to access such treatment The Bowers Court described the liberty interest at issue as the right of "homosexuals to engage in sodomy." The Lawrence Court rejected this 118 articulation of the asserted liberty interest. The Court explained that the sodomy statutes touch "upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that . . . is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals." The Court looked beyond the 119 statute to find the root of the liberty interest-the ability to structure a personal relationship. The ability to engage in homosexual sodomy was viewed as an outcome of the exercise of the liberty interest, not the liberty interest itself. The liberty interest was the ability to structure and control a personal relationship. The outcome of this liberty interest may be a desire 120 to engage in homosexual sodomy or some other action related to the personal relationship. A state cannot prohibit homosexual sodomy because such a prohibition would restrict the liberty interest of the individual to structure a personal relationship.
The Court relied heavily on the language in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, emphasizing the liberty to make decisions concerning marriage, 121 procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.
Casey described characteristics common to these liberty 122 interests:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
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The decisions concerning marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, children rearing, and education are all outcomes or variations of the fundamental right to structure and control a personal relationship. The Court concluded that persons in homosexual relationships should have the same freedom to make these decisions as persons in heterosexual relationships. Id. at 568-74 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) The Lawrence Court also departed from the Bowers Court's emphasis on the "ancient [historical] roots" of proscriptions against homosexual sodomy.
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The Lawrence Court moved away from an exclusive focus on the history of the prohibition or the acceptance of such activity, and instead included history as one element in the examination of the alleged liberty interest. The Court The en banc majority in Abigail Alliance also relied on history, but arrived at the conclusion that drug regulation is the norm and not the exception. In concluding that there is no tradition of protecting a right of 130 access to drugs, the majority traced the regulation of drugs back to 15th century England and the Colony of Virginia's 1736 act relating to the "dispensing of more drugs than was 'necessary or useful' because that practice had become 'dangerous and intolerable.'" The difference between these two 131 interpretations of the history of drug regulation lies in how one classifies the regulatory efforts. For example, the majority in the panel decision looked exclusively at the history of regulation of efficacy. The en banc majority, 132 however, broadened its analysis of history to include all drug regulation efforts. This broadening of the scope of the historical examination revealed a long history of drug regulation in both England and the United States. These S. 261, 279 (1990 ). 139. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997 two contradictory conclusions about the history of drug regulation reveal the dangers of relying exclusively on the history of regulation or lack thereof in examining an asserted liberty interest. The liberty interest examined in Lawrence is distinguishable from the interest in access to investigational drugs because the ability to access investigational drugs is not supported by an underlying constitutionally protected liberty interest. The liberty interest recognized in Lawrence is of persons less than sixteen years of age to access contraception. All of 137 these interests are some variation of the right to structure and control a personal relationship. An individual's decision to undergo treatment with investigational drugs would have fallen within the classification of "intimate and personal" choices described in Casey. However, there is not a long line of prior decisions leading to the conclusion that an individual has a right to access investigational drugs. The arguments in support of the right of an individual to access investigational drugs are derived from a liberty interest that the Supreme Court has yet to explicitly recognize, and which may have little or no legal 138 tradition to support it. In rejecting the asserted liberty interest to physicianassisted suicide, the Supreme Court cited the reluctance of the Court to "expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and openended." Furthermore, the Court limited the scope of the language in Casey 139 when it explained that the fact "[t]hat many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected . asserted liberty interest and the lack of support in recent constitutional jurisprudence suggests that the best approach to increasing access to investigational drugs for terminally ill patients is through changes in the current legislative and regulatory scheme governing the distribution of investigational drugs.
III. STATUTORY FOUNDATIONS FOR RIGHT TO ACCESS INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS
Perhaps the strongest argument in support of a right to access investigational drugs is that safety concerns in the FDCA do not apply to terminally ill patients. When discussing whether it is possible for a person to treat himself unjustly, Aristotle explained, "For he suffers voluntarily, but no one is voluntarily treated unjustly. . . . It is not possible to treat oneself
